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I. Introduction and Major Findings
In recent years interest in intergenerational economic mobility has increased greatly (Buron,
1994; Cao, 1997; Mulligan, 1993; Navarro-Zermeno, 1993; Solon, 1992; and Zimmerman, 1992a,
1992b). New sources of panel data have become available, allowing for mobility measurement based
on individuals' longer term -- rather than single year -- experience. The debates about the economic
and statistical models of mobility (Becker, 1989; Goldberger, 1989; and Mulligan, 1995), as well as
on the question "how equal the United States and other developed countries are?" (Becker and Tomes,
1986; Becker, 1989; Solon, 1992; and Zimmerman, 1992b) have apparently attracted many
economists into the field. Some sociologists who traditionally focused on occupational mobility have
also realized that income or earnings mobility maybe offer a better description of the degree to which
an individual's socioeconomic status is transmitted from his parents. For, among other things, people
tend to rank one another more in terms of income than in terms of occupation (Jencks, 1988).
  A. Linear Transmission Equation
Increased interest in intergenerational earnings or income mobility, however, has not settled
all issues in mobility studies. First, while both roles of the family and the society in determining
mobility are acknowledged, very few studies have addressed the two roles empirically simultaneously.
With its origin back at least to the last century (Galton, 1886), the statistical model neglects or
neutralizes family effects. In doing so, it usually specifies a linear mechanism for status transmission.
For example, in a typical model of intergenerational earnings mobility between fathers and sons, the
transmission equation is specified as
(1.1)
where and , measured away from their respective means, are the son's and father's earnings
statuses; is a random disturbance with zero mean and uncorrelated with and 2 is the
coefficient measuring intergenerational immobility: the effect of the father's status on the son's. Here,3
the transmission process is treated as a "black-box". The measurement of mobility is simply a
measurement of the association between the two earnings variables, without asking why there should
be any associations between them. 
The economic model, which was pioneered by Gary Becker (1981) and refined in Becker and
Tomes (1986), recognizes that both the family and the society play important roles in transmitting
status from one generation to the next. However, it does so only theoretically. Like the statistical
model, almost all empirical work based on the economic model has also followed a linear status
transmission equation, assuming a constant effect of the parents' statuses on the children's across
families (Behrman and Taubman, 1986; Peters, 1992). There are two drawbacks with the linear
specification. First, it is hard to believe that the intergenerational relationship upholding the very
notion of mobility is generally linear across families. After all, rich families may not prefer high
mobility as much as poor families, for high mobility tends to move poor families up while forcing
rich families down. Unless the effects of the society and the family work in exactly opposite
directions, a linear transmission equation would be a mis-specification of the intergenerational
relationship. 
A linear transmission equation also reduces the empirical power of the economic model. One
strength of the economic model over the statistical model is that the former dissects the "black-box"
neglected in the latter, and potentially allows for examining the relative importance of the family to
the society in determining mobility. But a linear transmission equation would make it difficult, if not
impossible, to decompose observed mobility into the components due to the family and the society,
as the equation makes the two models empirically indistinguishable.
  B. The Errors-in-Variables (EIV) Problem
Another unsettled issue in previous mobility studies is related to measurement of individual
status. Ideally, an individual's status should be measured in such a way that it indicates the individual's
permanent or lifetime position on the social ladder. There exists no such an ideal measure, however,4
because no data set contains information on an individual's experience over his entire life cycle. In
fact, except for educational attainment, all of the status measures used in previous mobility studies,
such as occupation and earnings in some particular ages, are short-run variables, subject to the time
of observation. But the use of short-run variables in place of permanent status would result in a classic
errors-in-variables (EIV) problem, and would generally lead to biased estimates of intergenerational
mobility (Becker and Tomes, 1986; Solon, 1992; and Zimmerman, 1992b). 
Two major strategies have been suggested to deal with the EIV problem. The first, taking
advantage of the availability of panel data, approximates individuals' permanent statuses by averaging
repeated observations on their single-year status measures. Since averaging single-year measures
reduces transitory noise relative to permanent status, this strategy is supposed to reduce the errors-in-
variables bias. The second strategy seeks to use "instrumental variables" to get a consistent estimate
of mobility, a very popular method to address general EIV problems.
Both strategies, however, have a common shortcoming: It regards an individual's permanent
status as a constant stream of earnings or income over his working span. But the working span itself
is a choice variable. It results from the individual's utility maximizing decisions on education and/or
retirement, and is not identical across individuals. The use of the constant stream as permanent status
thus ignores the impact on the status of differential working spans (Cao, 1997).
  C. An Outline of the Present Paper
This paper investigates intergenerational earnings mobility of men, with two specific
objectives: (i) overcoming or alleviating the errors-in-variables problem; and (ii) exploring non-linear
intergenerational relationships that may be helpful in examining the relative effect of the family to
society. To achieve the objectives, I use an individual's lifetime earnings as a proxy of his permanent
or long-term status, and set up a model permitting imputation of an individual's lifetime earnings on
the one hand, and justifying a non-linear relationship between fathers and sons in lifetime earnings
on the other.5
The baseline model envisions an individual's life cycle as consisting of two stages: young and
adult. When young, he makes decisions on human capital investment so as to maximize his lifetime
earnings. He does this based on his genetic endowments and parental investment. At the adult stage,
the individual becomes altruist father of his own son. Given his lifetime earnings, he maximizes his
lifetime utility by splitting the lifetime earnings between own consumption and the investment in his
son. At any time, the family, which is the basic unit of analysis, may thus be considered as a group
of two individuals, one at the young stage and the other at the adult stage.
The intergenerational relationship in lifetime earnings is determined not only by the genetic
connection between the father and the son, as well as the investment provided by the father, but also
by some non-family variables, as neither the father's nor the son's decision is made in the vacuum.
Therefore the observed relationship between fathers and sons in lifetime earnings must be the product
of the family and the society.
In Section II, I follow the spirit of the Becker-Tomes (1986) analysis to show how the lifetime
earnings are related intergenerationally. Unlike their linear approximation, I emphasize that the lifetime
earnings transmission equation is generally non-linear. This result offers an implicit guide to our
empirical tour. In Section III, I derive a profile for a representative individual's intertemporal earnings
as well as an index for his lifetime earnings. Central to the exercise is a simplified Ben-Porath (1967)
model of lifetime human capital investment, which was a benchmark in the early development of
human capital theory (Blinder and Weiss, 1976; Haley, 1973, and 1976; Heckman, 1976; and Rosen,
1976). After discussing empirical strategies to test my theory in Section IV, I report simulation results
in Section V, using the data from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID). Throughout the rest
of the work, I shall use "mobility" and "the elasticity of the son's lifetime earnings with respect to the
father's" interchangeably. Smaller elasticity, however, implies higher mobility.
The major empirical findings are as follows. The lifetime earnings transmission equation is
not linear. Using log lifetime earnings as baseline variable, a cubic equation is the best in describing
the intergenerational relationship. The elasticity of the son's lifetime earnings with respect to the6
father's, mostly between zero and unity, is not constant across families. Specifically the relationship
between the elasticity and the father's log lifetime earnings is of an inverted U shape: The elasticity
is relatively small for both rich and poor families, with the maximum in the middle. Consistent with
my predictions about the lifetime earnings transmission equation, the evidence not only supports a
familiar result of "regression to the mean", but establishes a "self-reinforcement" mechanism for the
result. That is, "regression to the mean" is stronger, the further a father's status is from the mean. 
Based on the cubic transmission equation, the average elasticity, or the elasticity for an
average family, is around .38. This number is greater than those based on short-run proxies and a
linear transmission equation, which are usually around .2 (Becker and Tomes, 1986). It is also greater
than those based on a linear transmission equation and at the same time with imputed lifetime
earnings as permanent status (.27). This suggests that both the EIV problem and a linear transmission
equation in the conventional approach contribute to the underestimation of the "average" degree to
which socioeconomic status is transmitted from one generation to the next. 
The analysis about the relative effects of the family and the society on earnings mobility is
not conclusive. But the exercises that compare mobility patterns in the real society with those in some
hypothesized worlds do indicate the importance of several identifiable non-family variables in
affecting mobility.
II. Lifetime Earnings Transmission
Consider a representative family in a world of full information. Unlike a real family, the
representative family is a group of two persons: the father and the son. The son inherits genetic
endowments from the father, who cares about not only his own consumption but also his son's
lifetime earnings.
A representative individual has a life cycle of two stages: young and adult. When young, the
individual maximizes his lifetime earnings, based on two personal parameters: initial       The assumption that the parameters are not completely determined by genetic endowments needs
1
elaborations. Basically, it is consistent with a well-known theory in the modern developmental
psychology that an individual's development results from the interaction between "nature" (genetic
endowments) and "nurture" (environmental forces). But this observation may cause inconsistency
within the model, because the assumption implies that the parameters should not be understood as
constants at the very beginning of the individual's life cycle: It takes time for environmental forces
to influence the individual's development. To avoid this inconsistency, one may mandate that an
individual's life cycle and hence, his young stage, does not begin until he reaches a certain age. The
two-stage life cycle modeled here therefore truncates some early part of experience from an
individual's real life cycle.
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0 0 human capital stock (K ) and learning efficiency ($ ). The initial human capital stock is the "amount"
of human capital embedded in the individual when he begins to make decisions on his lifetime human
capital investments, while the learning efficiency determines his learning speed. The two parameters
are assumed to be determined sequentially by an exogenous rule of genetic transmission and his
father's decision on the human capital investment in the individual:   and
 Here m indexes genetic endowments; and I is the father's investment in the
individual's human capital. An individual is smarter, the larger m. The effects of the father's
investment on the parameters are contingent on the genetic endowments. Given the endowments and
the investment, the parameters maximize the individual's lifetime earnings.
1
At the adult stage, the individual becomes altruistic father of his own son. Specifically, he
maximizes his lifetime utility
                               (2.1)
f by allocating his own lifetime earnings, W, between his own consumption, C, and the human capital
s investment in his son, I, based on the son's genetic endowments. W [.] in equation (2.1) is the son's
lifetime earnings. It is assumed to be increasing and concave in the investment I, and increasing in
the genetic endowments m. The average return to the investment, defined as is therefore
always greater than the marginal return and decreasing in I. 
The individual faces a "quasi-perfect" physical capital market: He faces a common and       Economists have long argued "that human capital is poor collateral to lenders. Children can
2
'default' on the market debt contracted for them by working less energetically or by entering
occupations with lower earnings but higher psychic income. ... Moreover, most societies are reluctant
to collect from children debts that were contracted by their parents, perhaps because the minority of
parents who do not care much about the welfare of their children would raise their own consumption
by leaving large debts to children." (Becker and Tomes, 1986, p. S10.)
       According to Mulligan (1995), who used the PSID to investigate the financial transfer from
3
parents to children, only 24% of the overall sample people have received or expect to receive positive
inheritance. Of those received or expecting to receive positive inheritance, only 12% have received
or expect to receive inheritance of more than $25,000. This means that, overall, only 3% of the people
have received or expect to receive inheritance of more than $25,000. Further, even $25,000 is very
small compared to an individual's lifetime earnings, which, according to our calculation later on, is
more than one million dollars in comparable value.
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constant interest rate at which he can freely borrow and lend within his own lifetime earning capacity.
However, he may not use the market to finance the human capital investment in his son, as human
capital is poor collateral and he cannot leave any debt to the son.  One implication is that poor fathers
2
are not able to invest in their sons as much as rich fathers.
Unlike many similar models, financial bequests from the father to the son are not considered
here, with an assumption that the bequest decisions either are independent of or have no significant
impact on the father's human capital investment in the son. There are several reasons for this
assumption. First, the primary purpose of the work is to investigate intergenerational earnings -- not
income -- mobility. Second, financial bequests on average are small compared to lifetime earnings.
3
Third, both propositions to be presented would still be valid without this assumption, although for
different reasons. The corollary from the propositions, while sensitive to the assumption, may lead
to an empirical way to demonstrate how serious the assumption is to the model.
Finding solution to the above utility maximizing problem is trivial. The optimal choices of
the investment and own consumption should be such that the marginal rate of substitution between
own consumption and the son's lifetime earnings, MRS, is equal to the marginal return to the
investment. That is,
 (2.2)        If financial bequests were allowed in the model, would be zero for those fathers
4
with very large lifetime earnings. Given their sons' genetic endowments, the best strategy for them
would be to fix I  at the level where is equal to the interest rate in the physical capital
*
market, and then transfer to their sons financial bequests.
9
The interior solution is guaranteed due to the assumption neutralizing financial bequests. Generally
both the investment and own consumption are functions of the father's lifetime earnings as well as
the son's genetic endowments. Denote the optimal investment as  where
 From equation (2.2), one has
4
(2.3)
The elasticity of the son's lifetime earnings with respect to the father's, 2, can be calculated as
 (2.4)
where  R, as defined earlier, is the average return to the father's investment; and is the
elasticity of the father's investment with respect to his lifetime earnings. Since the father values both
I his own consumption and his son's lifetime earnings, 2 0 (0, 1). 
The elasticity of the son's lifetime earnings with respect to his father's is positively related to
I the father's willingness to invest in his son (2) and the marginal rate of substitution (MRS), but
negatively related to the average return to the father's investment ®). Holding constant MRS and R,
II a greater 2 implies more investment by the father in the son; holding constant 2 and R, a greater
I MRS implies that the son is smarter; and, finally, holding constant 2 and MRS, a greater R implies
that the son is less smart. Consequently, equation (2.4) seems to claim that earnings mobility is
determined only by family-related factors.
But non-family factors also have a say on earnings mobility. Examples include the valuation
scheme of human capital and the "quasi-perfect" physical capital market. The former, apparently
dependent on labor demand and supply, is important in determining an individual's lifetime earnings.
The later not only influences the real values of individuals' lifetime earnings, but may also limit poor       If the physical capital market could be used to finance investment in his son, a poor father
5
would invest more in the son's human capital than he does in the "quasi-perfect" capital market.
10
fathers' abilities to "optimize" human capital investment in their sons.  
5
I Since 2, MRS and R in equation (2.4) are all equilibrium results corresponding to the
individual's maximized utility, neither of them is generally independent of his lifetime earnings. This
leads to the following proposition.
sf Proposition 1:  Intergenerational lifetime earnings transmission equation, W  = F(W), is
generally not linear or log-linear.
The proposition has an important empirical implication. Other things being equal, fathers with
different lifetime earnings may have different impact on their children's earnings. Generally the
elasticity of the son's lifetime earnings with respect to the father's is not constant across families. The
linearity convention in previous studies of intergenerational earnings mobility is therefore not
necessarily legitimate.
Proposition 1 gives no clue about how the elasticity varies across families. In fact, the lifetime
earnings transmission equation may take any forms. To see this, define as "modified
f elasticity of the father's investment in the son". Find the elasticity of 2 with respect to W from
DR equation (2.4): where 2  and 2  are elasticities of D and R with respect to
fD R W. In general both 2  and 2  can be of any signs, and so can Formally,
Proposition 2: Intergenerational earnings mobility may not only vary across families, but
also show a non-monotonic relationship with the father's lifetime earnings.
The magnitude of 2 often has special interpretations. Particularly, when its absolute value is
less than unity, one says that "regression to the mean" -- as opposed to "regression away from the
mean" -- happens, in the sense that sons of rich families would tend to be less rich, whereas sons of
I poor families would tend to be less poor. Since the elasticity of the father's investment, 2, is between       One might argue that the above results are valid only for representative families, which, relative
6
to real families, ignore uncertainty and the roles of the mothers, simplify the families' fertility
behavior, and when a family has more than one child, ignore differential preferences that the parents
might give to different children. This argument is not true (Cao, 1997) The basic results would only
be reinforced in the context of real families.
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zero and unity, and the average return to the investment, R, is always greater than the marginal return,
which in equilibrium is equal to MRS, the following corollary is therefore obvious.
Corollary: Equation (2.4) implies "regression to the mean".
I That the elasticity of the father's investment 2 is greater than zero but less than unity plays
I a crucial role in this corollary. If financial bequests were added to the model, this 2 would be equal
to zero for some very rich families, and so would the elasticity 2. For those rich families, the sons'
lifetime earnings would be completely independent of the fathers', and the corollary would not be
valid. However, the two propositions would still hold water, as the intergenerational relationship in
lifetime earnings would not be continuous over all families.
On the other hand, if the marginal return to the father's investment was independent of the
I investment, and, simultaneously, the utility function was homothetic, 2 would be equal to one, while
MRS would be equal to R. The earnings elasticity 2 would be reduced to exactly unity. Neither of
the above propositions or corollary would hold. Therefore, empirical evidence on "regression to the
mean" or "regression away from the mean" may demonstrate how serious these alternative
assumptions would be to the model.
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III.  Intertemporal and Lifetime Earnings
The representative individual's lifetime earnings is a key to our enterprise. While fixed at the
adult stage, the earnings results from his first stage calculation. 
0 0 Imagine the following scenario. Given the personal parameters, $  and K , the individual tries12
to develop a strategy for the adult stage, allocating his time between learning and earning activities,
and maximizing his lifetime earnings evaluated at the beginning of the stage or the base period, 0,
 (3.1)
tt Here W is the individual's discounted lifetime earnings; y is his intertemporal earnings at period t; K
t is his intertemporal human capital stock, and s 0 [0, 1] is the fraction of his time -- normalized to be
unity -- devoted to the learning activity; a is the human capital price he faces, assumed to be constant
over his planning horizon [0, T]; and, finally, r is the rate of interest prevailing in the "quasi-perfect"
capital market depicted in the last section. Note that the intertemporal earnings is defined as the
t difference between the potential earnings, aK, and the foregone earnings due to the learning activity,
tt a(sK). Also human capital price is the value of one unit of human capital. Although it is constant for
the individual over his life cycle, the price may vary across individuals of different cohorts, capturing
some effects of the non-family variables.
The individual has a simplified Ben-Porath (1967) type of human capital production function
 (3.2)
t where  Q is the amount of human capital produced at t, and " 0 (0, 1] is a parameter identical for all
individuals, reflecting the human commonality. The equation of motion is familiar,
 (3.3)
where  * is a positive depreciation rate of human capital. Notice that, with equation (3.3), the model
implies that the intertemporal human capital stock is continuous over the adult stage.
Following Ben-Porath (1967), three phases of human capital investment are suggested by the
tt constraint on s. The first corresponds to s = 1. The available human capital stock, even fully allocated
to produce human capital, is not large enough to yield optimal human capital stock. In this phase the
individual specializes in the learning activity, and, if the human capital depreciation rate is not too high,13
the available human capital stock should keep on increasing. This tendency continues until some point
t when the available human capital stock becomes so large that s is no longer equal to 1. Consequently,
t he switches some of his time from learning to earning. The third and last phase is s = 0, when the
stock of human capital is too large to produce more human capital. Obviously, the first and last phases
correspond to corner solutions, while the second to an interior one.
The optimal path of the human capital investment is derived in Appendix A. With appropriate
assumptions and restrictions, the path allows us to determine the individual's intertemporal and lifetime
earnings, as well as the "transition period" that is probably empirically observable. Among the results
most relevant to the present paper are:
1. The Schooling Equation. Define the transition period, t , as one when the individual switches from
*
the first phase of human capital investment to the second. Since people usually specialize in human
capital production in the regular schools, earning nothing before entering the labor market, the period
may be measured as regular schooling years. Mathematically, it is the solution to the following equation
-- called the "schooling equation" later,
 
     (3.4)
2. The Admissibility of ": " = n/(n+1), with n a positive integer. Without this restriction, one cannot
find closed form expressions for the individual's intertemporal and lifetime earnings, two building






      (3.5c)
The earnings has familiar features. It is zero when t # t , because the individual specializes in
*
human capital production in that range. After the transition period, it becomes positive, and increasing
in t -- at least initially. After reaching its maximum, the earnings may decline or fluctuate over the
remaining periods, provided that the intertemporal human capital stock so behaves (Cao, 1997).
4. Unadjusted Lifetime Earnings:
              (3.6)
where
              (3.6a)
 if j = 0 and r = 0, (3.6b)
and
otherwise. (3.6c)15
Equation (3.6) gives "unadjusted" lifetime earnings because the base period, 0, to which the
earnings is discounted is generally not comparable from one individual to another. To adjust for this,
one may set a common reference time, J, and re-discount the unadjusted earnings to J. Let the period
J difference between the individual's base period and the reference time J be A . The adjusted lifetime
earnings may then be calculated as
 (3.7) 
Notice that, given the population parameters and the ending period T, the transition period t
*
is completely determined by the individual parameters (equation (3.4)), and so is the unadjusted lifetime
earnings (equation (3.6)). Also, both the intertemporal and lifetime earnings are proportional to an
individual-specific constant g, which builds a convenient bridge between the two earnings. For example,
if one finds a way to impute the constant based on the intertemporal earnings, one should easily find
the lifetime earnings.  
IV. The PSID Data and Empirical Implementation
  A. The PSID Data
I used intergenerational data from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) to examine the
validity of the model. A longitudinal survey, the PSID commenced in 1968 with a national probability
sample of about 5,000 families. It emphasizes the dynamic aspects of economic and demographic
behavior, and contains a wide range of sociological and psychological measures. The covered time span
for this work is from 1968 to 1989. 
Since the model concentrates on intergenerational relationships of men, and requires information
on individuals' earnings, not all the families retained in the PSID were used in this work. Instead, a sub-
sample of families was selected, with each family consisting of two persons, indexed as "father" and
"son". To be eligible, a "father" must have been recorded as "family head" -- as opposed to "family       The best known panel survey carried out in the United States by the Institute for Social
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Research at the University of Michigan (Atkinson et al., 1992), the PSID has been used by many
other people (notably, Hill and Duncan, 1987; Mulligan, 1993; and Solon, 1992) to exploit
intergenerational relationships. Most of these people limit their samples to the Survey Research Center
(SRC) component of the PSID, because the other component -- the Survey of Economic Opportunity
(SEO) component -- is believed to over-represent the low income population. A recent development
on individual weights, however, makes it possible to combine the two components together (Hill,
1992). 
16
member" -- at least once before 1972, while a "son" must not only have "father" who himself is
eligible, but have also become "family head" within the covered time span. I chose the sub-sample in
this way because (i) the PSID collects information on "total annual labor income", the variable
containing information on an individual's intertemporal earnings, only for a family head; and (ii) for
a "father" who became "family head" after 1972, there was little information about his "son". In case
an selected family had several "sons", the oldest was chosen to maximize information for the family.
Further, the families that had never reported positive annual labor income were dropped. Using the
above criteria, I obtained 663 families.
7
t The relationship between intertemporal earnings, y, and total annual labor income, indexed as
t Y, should be clearly understood. Total annual labor income or annual earnings is the amount of money




t t and  S is defined in equation (3.5c). Notice that total annual labor income Y is also proportional to the
individual-specific constant g.
I defined the base period in the model, when an individual begins to make decisions on his own
human capital investment, as equivalent to age 6, for several reasons. First, it is consistent with the fact
that people usually begin formal education at age 6. One might argue that a child of 6 years old cannot       Both initial human capital stock and learning efficiency are sensitive to the timing of the base
8
period. But learning efficiency, which determines an individual's learning speed, is more sensitive. A
relevant question is: Is an individual's learning speed about constant around 6 years old? While there
is no agreement on this question, one piece of evidence from the developmental psychology seems
to support a positive answer: The development of an individual's neural system reaches its full
potential around age 10. By age 6, it reaches about 90 percent of the potential.
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make his own decisions. But given the nature of the model, which bars uncertainty, a 6 years old boy
would make decisions just in the same way that an individual of any other age would. 
The choice of 6 years old as the base period is also consistent with the assumption about an
individual's personal parameters. Recall that those parameters are not predetermined, but dependent on
various environmental forces in general and his father's investment in the individual in particular. It
takes time for environmental forces to influence the formation of the parameters. Six years seem to be
an appropriate time span for the task.
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Aware of potential criticisms, which will be discussed in the next section, I assumed that all
individuals retire at age 65. Their ending periods (T) were therefore uniformly equal to 59. In addition,
as discussed earlier, I measured their transition periods (t ) by their regular schooling years. Their
*
working spans were thus equal to (59-t ), which may differ from one individual to another. Among
*
other important information from the PSID used in this work was a vector of age or cohort dummies,
and a vector of exogenous variables reflecting an individual's early family background, including early
residency, early economic condition, father's and mother's education, father's early occupation, and
number of siblings. A statistical summary and the definitions of the above variables are in Table 1.
  B. Imputing Lifetime Earnings and Cohort Human Capital Prices
The analysis in Section III provides the base for imputing individual-specific lifetime earnings
and cohort-specific human capital prices. The former will be used as proxy of an individual's permanent
status, while the latter helps examine the effect of non-family factors on earnings mobility.
To impute lifetime earnings, I resorted to repeated observations in the PSID on total annual
t labor income Y, as well as the relationship between lifetime earnings and the total annual labor income.18
Table 1.  The Sample Characteristics
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                          Pooled                      Father                    Son
                                     -----------------------------------------------------------------------------
Variable  Definition            Mean      S.D.       Mean       S.D.        Mean      S.D.
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Race
   white .918        .275       .927        .260         .909       .287
nonwhite .082        .275       .073        .260         .091       .287
Religion
 protest .592        .492       .642        .480         .549       .498
catholic .190        .392       .178        .383         .201       .401
  jewish .084        .278       .112        .315         .060       .237
  others .134        .340       .069        .254         .191       .394
Early Residency
   rural .239        .426       .337        .473         .151       .358
    town .438        .496       .343        .475         .522       .500
    city .324        .468       .320        .467         .327       .469
Early Economic Condition
    good .241        .428       .128        .334         .343       .475
 average .446        .497       .378        .485         .507       .500
    poor .312        .464       .495        .500         .150       .358
Father's Education (Schooling Years)
    fed1    0 - 5  .092        .289       .145        .352         .045       .207
    fed2    6 - 8  .355        .479       .590        .492         .145       .352
    fed3    9 - 11 .104        .305       .071        .257         .132       .339
    fed4      12   .229        .420       .097        .296         .346       .476
    fed5    12 -   .221        .415       .097        .296         .332       .471
Mother's Education (Schooling Years)
    med1    0 - 5  .120        .325       .201        .401         .049       .215
    med2    6 - 8  .217        .412       .367        .482         .084       .277
    med3    9 - 11 .117        .321       .108        .310         .125       .331
    med4      12   .375        .484       .260        .439         .477       .500
    med5    12 -   .171        .377       .064        .246         .266       .442
Father's Occupation When Respondent Was Young
   focc1  professional &
           technical   .110        .313       .057        .232         .157       .364
   focc2  manager &
           official   .073        .260       .053        .225         .091       .287
   focc3  self-employed
           business    .054        .225       .077        .267         .032       .177 
   focc4  clerical &
           sales worker .069        .253       .035        .185         .099       .299
   focc5  craftsman &
           foreman    .222        .415       .203        .402         .238       .426
   focc6  operatives .158        .365       .161        .368         .156       .363
   focc7  laborer & service
           worker    .071        .257       .082        .275         .061       .239       This assumption is in sharp contrast with most of the Ben-Porath type of studies on human
9
capital investment (e.g., Heckman, 1976; Rosen, 1976). Those studies concentrated on the earnings
profile for a representative individual, with an objective to estimate the population parameters. Since
my interest is not in the representative earnings profile but in individual differences, I will not pay




                                          Pooled                      Father                    Son
                                     -----------------------------------------------------------------------------
Variable  Definition            Mean      S.D.       Mean       S.D.        Mean      S.D.
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
   focc8  farmer & farm
           manager      .159        .365       .264        .441         .065       .247
   focc9  all others  .085        .280       .067        .251         .101       .302
Number of Siblings
   sib01  0 - 1    .232        .422       .204        .403         .257       .438
   sib24  2 - 4    .515        .500       .437        .496         .584       .493
   sib5   5 -      .253        .435       .359        .480         .159       .366
Regular Schooling Years
   yrsch                          12.97        2.50      12.12        2.68        13.72       2.05
Age in 1988
   age88                45.75      15.46      60.24        8.22        32.85       6.19
Sample Size                                  1,326                       663                        663
Annual Labor Income
(1984 Dollars)            24,760    22,193      29,003    26,242    20,984    16,963
Number of Obs. for
Income                                 18,591                    12,562                    6,689
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Note: All variables but "yrsch", "age88", "annual labor income", and sample size are dummies.
ij Let individual j of cohort i's unadjusted lifetime earnings be W ; and his total annual labor income at
ijt ij age (t+6) be Y . Assume that the population parameters are known. W may then be imputed as
9
 (4.2)
ij ijt where the definition of '  is in equations (3.6a)-(3.6c), and the definition of A  in equation (4.1a).
Note that the individual-specific constant g was imputed as an average over all observations available
on total annual labor income:       In theory, one can specify the transmission process as a polynomial equation of any order. But
10
preliminary tests show that polynomial equations with orders higher than in (4.6d) would yield no
new, if not worse, results.
20
 (4.2a)
Each individual might have different number of observations. Generally the imputation was more
accurate for an individual who had more observations on the income, and if the observations were
more spread over an individual's life cycle.
The imputation of the cohort-specific human capital prices was based on the schooling equation
(3.4), along with the following assumptions: (i) an individual's initial human capital stock is determined
by a vector of exogenous variables reflecting his early family background, X; and (ii) the cohort-
specific human capital price can be estimated by a vector of cohort dummies, d. The detailed
imputation strategy is given in appendix B.
  C. Intergenerational Earnings Transmission Equations
I measured an individual's lifetime or permanent status by the logarithm of his adjusted lifetime
earnings. Following Proposition 1 in Section II, I used a set of polynomial equations to describe the






01 where  W  was adjusted lifetime earnings; subscripts s and f indicated "son" and "father", and 2 , 2 ,
*
23 4 2 ,  2 , and 2  were coefficients to be estimated.
10
Which of the above specifications is the best is purely an empirical question. Specification tests
will be conducted in the next section to answer the question, based on the idea that the best21
specification should have the highest likelihood to match data.
The specification tests, together with the signs and the magnitudes of the earnings elasticities,
have important implications for my model. If the linear specification is the best, my theory would gain
nothing new or testable relative to the conventional approach to the process of intergenerational status
transmission. If the quadratic specification is the best, Proposition 1 would be supported, while
Proposition 2, which claims non-monotonicity of the relationship between 2 and would not.
If the cubic or the quadrinomial specification is the best, both Propositions 1 and 2 would be
supported. In any event, if the absolute values of the earnings elasticities are less than unity, the
corollary of "regression to the mean" would be supported, and some key assumptions in the model,
especially the assumption that financial bequests either are independent of or have no significant impact
on the father's human capital investment in the son, would survive.
The baseline variable in the earnings transmission equations, log adjusted lifetime earnings,
is dependent on the father's and the son's ages at reference time J. The earnings elasticities calculated
from the transmission equations are therefore subject to the age distributions of fathers and sons in the
population, or "age structure" for short. In the cubic transmission equation, for example, age structure
affects earnings elasticities in two ways. First, the four coefficients in the equation are subject to both
fathers' and the sons' ages at reference time J. Second, fathers' ages affect their log adjusted lifetime
earnings, a variable directly determining earnings elasticities.
One important theme in the model is  that intergenerational earnings mobility is determined
by both family and non-family factors. For family factors, I have enumerated genetic connections
between generations and parental altruism toward children. For non-family factors, I have listed the
quasi-perfect physical capital market and cohort-specific human capital prices. Age structure just
defined  is another non-family factor. To be sure, the age difference between a father and his son
results from the individual family's fertility decisions. But the age distribution of each generation, and
the age differences between two generations are beyond any individual family's control.        One major objection to an interest rate of .02 or .05 might be that the interest rate should be
11
equal to the rate of return to human capital investment, which is usually higher than .05. In my
model, however, the interest rate is not required to be the same as the rate of return. As indicated in
equation (2.2), with financial bequests neutralized, the rate of return may be of any value, and may
vary from one individual to another.
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V. The Results
I report empirical results for six sets of population parameters, B / (", r, *): " = ½, 2/3, or
12 3/4;  r = .02 or .05; and * = .05. The following notations are used: B  = (½, .02, .05); B  = (½, .05,
345 6 .05);  B  = (2/3, .02, .05); B  = (2/3, .05, .05); B  = (3/4, .02, .05); and B  = (3/4, .05, .05). The choice
of the depreciation rate of human capital is based on estimates from Haley (1976) and Heckman
(1976), who adopted models similar to Ben-Porath (1967). As required, the "'s are in the admissible
set. They guarantee closed form expressions for an individual's intertemporal and lifetime earnings.
Relative to the estimates by Haley (1976), Heckman (1976) and Rosen (1976), the interest rates are
low. However, since the most important role of the interest rate in my model is in converting earnings
at different periods of the life cycle into comparable, a low interest rate seems to be reasonable.
11
  A. Lifetime Earnings: Unadjusted versus Adjusted
Table 2, panel A summarizes the unadjusted lifetime earnings for both the fathers and sons for
the selected population parameters. The lifetime earnings were not very sensitive to ". But they seemed
to be very sensitive to the interest rate. For the fathers, the mean earnings were about $450,000 when
r = .02 while about $150,000 when r = .05. For the sons, the corresponding mean earnings were about
$800,000 and $260,000. Alternatively, the mean earnings at r = .02 were three times as large as at r
= .05. Considering the way that the lifetime earnings were imputed, however, the high sensitivity of
the lifetime earnings to the interest rate was deceiving. To see this, I added to the panel constant
annual earnings, that would yield the same amount of lifetime earnings as the means. For the
fathers, the annual earnings would be about $19,000 if r = .02, and about $15,500 if r = .05. For the
sons, the corresponding annual earnings would be about $33,000 and $26,000, respectively. Clearly,
the sensitivity of the annual earnings to the interest rate was much lower than implied in the mean        The 2% generational premium is consistent with evidence reported elsewhere. For example,
12
according to Levy and Murnane (1992), who reviewed earnings levels and inequality in the United
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Table 2.  Summary of the Unadjusted and Adjusted Lifetime Earnings
(in thousand dollars)
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
 A. Unadjusted      B. Adjusted
       -------------------------------------------------------------    -----------------------------
                              Father                    Son            Generational           Father   Son  
       ------------------     ------------------      Premium     --------- ---------
                                     
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
  " = ½
1  B r = .02         458.5      19.2       804.7      33.7         .02 0        1,393.3 1,418.6
  * = .05        (305.5)                 (506.8)     (913.6) (852.6)
  " = ½
2  B r = .05         155.4      15.5      259,0      25.9         .018          2,639.0 1,100.0
  * = .05        (101.5)                (161.0)    (1,881.6) (664.9)
" = 2/3
3  B r = .02         450.3      18.9      803.0      33.6         .021          1,370.0 1,415.5
* = .05        (298.7)                (508.3)      (896.3) (852.9)
" = 2/3
4  B r = .05         154.2      15.4      259.9      26.0         .019          2,619.5 1,103.4
* = .05        (100.6)                (161.8)    (1,866.6) (666.8)
" = 3/4
5  B r = .02         443.5      18.6      782.6      32.8         .020          1,353.2 1,378.7
* = .05        (292.4)                (497.2)      (885.8) (832.4)
" = 3/4
6  B r = .05         153.4      15.3      259.2      25.9         .019          2,612.0 1,100.0
* = .05        (99.7)                  (161.7)    (1,867.7) (664.4)
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Notes:  W is the mean value of lifetime earnings. Generational
premium is defined as annual growth rate of the sons' unadjusted lifetime earnings relative to the
sf fathers': (lnW -lnW)/28, where 28 refers to the average age difference between the generations. The
adjusted earnings are in the 1984 price. Standard errors are in parentheses.
lifetime earnings. 
The differences between the fathers and the sons in the mean lifetime earnings seems to be huge.
Over the life cycle, a son on the average earns about 70 percent more than a father does. However, the
generational premium, defined as annual growth rate of the mean value of the sons' lifetime earnings
relative to that of the fathers, is only around .02 (see the last column in the panel).
12States over the past fifty years, disposable income per full-time worker increased by 2.45% per year
from 1947-73, but only by .67% per year from 1973-88.
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In terms of real lifetime earnings, the sons are not better-off than the fathers. When the interest
rate is .02, the 2% generational premium implies that the sons at best have the same real lifetime
earnings as their fathers'; when the interest rate is .05, the sons even have lower real lifetime earnings.
The higher the interest rate, the lower the sons' real lifetime earnings relative to their fathers'. In fact,
one of the reasons why I did not choose an interest rate as high as, say, .10 is that a high interest rate
would put the sons' real lifetime earnings much lower than their fathers', a result contradicting to
common sense.
Adjusted lifetime earnings differ from the unadjusted in that the former are sensitive to the
common reference time (see equation 3.7). Since the reference time may be set arbitrarily, the
properties possessed by the adjusted lifetime earnings such as means and standard deviations are not
generalizable. The earnings therefore may only be understood as indexes. Table 2, panel B summarizes
the lifetime earnings when adjusted to year 1984. Both the sons' and the fathers' adjusted earnings were
higher than their unadjusted, because their base periods were both earlier than 1984 (i.e., both the sons
and the fathers were born before 1978). The sons' lifetime earnings were equal to or less than their
fathers' because the fathers' earnings were discounted to the time when they were, on the average, 56
years old, while the sons' earnings to the time when they were only 28. It is important to note that,
although a different reference time would lead to different adjusted lifetime earnings, reference time
has a very marginal effect on our results about earnings mobility. 
For both the fathers and the sons, the average adjusted lifetime earnings were more than one
million dollars in the 1984 price. These figures were much larger than the average financial transfers
from fathers to sons (Mulligan, 1995), suggesting that, as far as lifetime earnings is concerned,




  B. Intergenerational Earnings Transmission  
a. Non-linearities: cubic transmission equation
Four polynomial equations (4.6a - 4.6d) were estimated to examine the nature of
intergenerational earnings transmission. For reasons that will be clear later, I used the cubic equation
as baseline, testing the hypothesis that an alternative equation was better than the cubic in depicting
the relationship between the fathers' and the sons' log lifetime earnings (Appendix C). The regression
13 5 results are reported in Table 3a for the population parameters B , B , and B , and in Table 3b for the
other selected population parameters. 
s For all specifications in Tables 3a and 3b, the dependent variables were log(W ), and the
*
ff independent variables were, log(W ), [log(W )] , etc.  All regression were weighted. Regression
** 2
coefficients were significant, except for the quadrinomial specification, where none of its five
coefficients was significant.  The hypothesis that an alternative specification is better than the cubic
13
was tested by an F-statistic listed in the last columns of the tables. For the linear specification, the null
12 3 hypothesis was 2  = 2  = 0; for the quadratic specification, it was 2  = 0; and for the quadrinomial
4 specification, it was 2  = 0. A rejection of a hypothesis would statistically support a claim that the
cubic specification is the better than the relevant specification, while a non-rejection would support the
otherwise. The F-statistics in Table 3a and Table 3b show that the cubic specification was better than
both linear and quadratic, while at least not worse than the quadrinomial. In conjunction with the fact
that none of the regression coefficients in the quartic was significant, this exercise suggested that the
cubic specification was the best in describing the relationship between fathers' and sons' log lifetime
earnings. And, as a byproduct, intergenerational lifetime earnings transmission equation was not linear
or log-linear, supporting Proposition 1 in Section II.26
Table 3a. Intergenerational Earnings Transmission Equations
135 (Population Parameters: B , B , B )
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                   Population                                                                      Adjusted          F 
012 3 4 Specification   Parameters     2            2            2           2           2          R             Value
2
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                   "=1/2       10.449      .255         --           --           --        .061       8   .867  
a
                        (.539)     (.038)  
                   "=2/3       10.484      .253         --           --           --        .060      8.680  
a
Linear                 (.539)     (.039) 
        
                   "=3/4       10.528      .248         --           --           --        .058       8.280
a
                        (.539)     (.039) 
             --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                   "=1/2       32.381    -2.900      .113        --           --        .073      8.515
a
                      (7.283)    (1.046)    (.038) 
                   "=2/3       32.285    -2.887      .113        --          --        .071      8.232
a
Quadratic          (7.274)    (1.046)    (.038) 
 
                   "=3/4       31.656    -2.780      .110        --          --        .068      7.965
a
                   (7.261)    (1.045)    (.038) 
             --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                   "=1/2      233.33    -46.32     3.234      -.075       --       .083        -- 
                     (69.25)    (14.92)    (1.07)     (.026) 
                   "=2/3       228.31    -45.31     3.166      -.073       --       .081        --
Cubic                (68.70)    (14.82)    (1.07)     (.025) 
       
                   "=3/4       222.88    -44.22      3.094     -.071       --      .080        -- 
                     (68.18)    (14.72)    (1.06)     (.025) 
             --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                   "=1/2     -209.00     82.46    -10.78       .60      -.01    .082       .464
                    (652.53)  (189.50)  (20.59)   (.99)    (.02)  
Quadri-     "=2/3     -215.34     84.08    -10.94       .61      -.01    .080       .480
nomial        (644.66)  (187.52)  (20.41)   (.98)    (.02) 
  
                   "=3/4               -203.98     80.39    -10.50      .59      -.01     .077       .457
                    (636.63)  (185.37)  (20.19)   (.98)    (.02) 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
s Notes: r = .02, and * = .05. The dependent variables were log(W ), while the independent variables
*
ff were log(W ), [log(W )] , etc. All regressions were weighted. "F-Value" in the last column stands for
** 2
the  F statistic under a null hypothesis that an alternative specification is better than the cubic. The
superscript "a" indicates that the null hypothesis is rejected at a significance level .01. The specification
tests support that the cubic specification is better than any other polynomial specification listed here.
 
   
The cubic transmission equation implied that the elasticity of the son's lifetime earnings with
respect to the father's was a quadratic function of the father's status or log lifetime earnings. In each of        Setting the first derivative of 2 with respect to equal to zero, one knows that the
14
elasticity curve begins to fall with when the father's status reaches a turning
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Table 3b. Intergenerational Earnings Transmission Equations
246 (Population Parameters: B , B , B )
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                    Population                                                                        Adjusted          F 
0 1 234 Specification   Parameters     2              2            2           2           2           R             Value
2
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                   "=1/2        9.608      .284           --          --            --        .083     5.845  
a
                          (.533)     (.036)  
                   "=2/3        9.631      .282           --          --            --        .082     5.879  
a
Linear                 (.532)     (.036) 
        
                   "=3/4        9.659      .281           --          --            --        .082     5.770
a
                         (.530)     (.036) 
             --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                   "=1/2       20.612    -1.229      .052        --            --        .084     9.562
a
                      (7.614)    (1.045)    (.036) 
                   "=2/3       20.775    -1.250      .053        --            --        .084     9.572
a
Quadratic          (7.605)    (1.044)    (.036) 
 
                   "=3/4       20.627    -1.228      .051        --            --        .083     9.397
a
                   (7.556)    (1.038)    (.036) 
             --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                   "=1/2       273.58    -53.34     3.622      -.081       --        .096       -- 
                     (82.15)    (16.88)    (1.16)     (.026) 
                   "=2/3       273.31    -53.30     3.621      -.081       --        .096       --
Cubic                (81.97)    (16.86)    (1.15)     (.026) 
       
                   "=3/4       269.34    -52.51     3.569      -.080       --        .095       -- 
                     (81.49)    (16.76)    (1.15)     (.026) 
             --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                   "=1/2      820.62   -204.29    19.201     -.794     .012    .095      .415
                    (851.05)  (234.34)   (24.15)  (1.104)   (.02)  
Quadri-         "=2/3      815.71   -203.09    19.093     -.790     .012    .095      .412
nomial        (846.71)  (233.33)   (24.07)  (1.101)  (.02) 
  
                   "=3/4      833.76   -208.46    19.684    -.819     .012     .094      .456
                    (839.41)  (231.43)   (23.88)  (1.093)  (.02) 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Note: See notes for Table 3a.
23 the six cubic equations reported in Tables 3a and 3b, 2  was positive and 2  negative, implying that
the elasticity curve was concave from below in the father's status. Further, the non-trivial magnitudes
32 of  2 's relative to 2 's suggested that the elasticity curves were of an inverted U shape, supporting
1432 point The non-trivial 2  relative to 2  makes sure that the turning point is not an outlier,
but in the middle of the father's status ladder.
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Proposition 2 about non-monotonicity.
The non-linearities of the intergenerational transmission process may also be examined
numerically. In Table 4, under the title "cubic equation", I report the earnings elasticities for six
representative families: the families in which the fathers’ statuses were at the 5 , 25 , 50 , 75  and 95
th th th th th
percentiles, and equal to the mean value of the sampled fathers’ log lifetime earnings. The columns are
arranged by the father’s status. For instance, “25 ” stands for the family in which the father’s log
th
lifetime earnings are at the 25  percentile, while “mean” stands for the family in which the father’s log
th
lifetime earnings are equal to the mean. The mean elasticities – or the elasticities corresponding to the
“mean” family – were about .38. For most families -- more than 95 percent, the absolute values of the
elasticities were less than unity, rendering strong support for the corollary of “regression to the mean”.
In addition, relative to the families with middle positions, both poor and rich families had lower
elasticities or higher mobility, confirming the inverted U-shape of the elasticity curves.
Table 4. The Elasticities of the Son's adjusted Lifetime Earnings
with respect to the Father's: Cubic and Linear Status Transmission Equation
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                     Cubic Equation                        
-------------------------------------------------
                                                    Father's log earnings: Percentile                 Linear    
               -------------------------------------------------            Equation
5th 25th Mean 50th 75th 95th             
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
1 B -.063 .285 .371 .380 .416 .394    .255
2 B  .002 .334 .402 .405 .410 .304    .284
3 B -.064 .281 .367 .375 .411 .392    .253
4 B -.002 .333 .400 .404 .409 .304    .282
5 B -.006 .279 .360 .366 .401 .381    .248
6 B  .000 .331 .397 .400 .405 .299    .281
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------        One might, however, suspect that the inverted U-shape of elasticity curves is economically
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spurious, nothing more than a statistical phenomenon that the probability of a poor (or rich) family
becoming poorer (richer) is limited by its current position of being poor (rich). While detailed
explanations about the shape are offered in later sections, I have two immediate reasons to dispel the
suspicion. First, these are earnings elasticity curves–not earnings or log earnings curves. The potential
effects of the father’s status–if any–on the son’s have already been controlled. Second, the curves have
been found to be favored systematically over any other important alternative in describing the
intergenerational relationship (see Tables 3a and 3b). Ever there were only statistical forces behind
the curves, one has to explain why an inverted U-shape–rather than, say, a U-shape–is systematically
favored.
29
b. The Elasticity Curves and Regression to the Mean
The inverted U-shape of elasticity curves is a very important finding  First, it supports my
15
theoretical model, which indicates that intergenerational mobility is generally not the same across
families. It also offers a new insight into the familiar result of “regression to the mean”. That is,
“regression to the mean” is stronger, the further a father’s status is from the mean. Relative to the
families with middle positions, rich families have lower elasticities, so their children’s statuses are less
dependent on the fathers’ high statuses, pushing the children down toward to the middle. On the other
hand, for poor families–those very poor with the absolute values of their elasticities greater than unity
excluded, lower elasticities imply that their children’s statuses are less confined to their fathers’ low
statuses, pushing the children up to the middle.
Evidence on "regression to the mean" or "regression away from the mean" has been suggested
as an internal check for several alternative assumptions in the model. The strong evidence documented
here on "regression to the mean" rejects the assumptions that the marginal return to the parental
investment is independent of the investment and, at the same time, the individual utility function is
homothetic. If those assumptions held water, the elasticities would be uniformly equal to unity. In
addition, the fact that the elasticities for families as rich as at the 95th percentile are well above zero
implies that the assumption that the bequest decisions either are independent of or have no significant
impact on the parental investment may not be very strong. For otherwise one should expect the      The elasticities were decreasing for rich families, and they did reach and even fell below zero
16
for some extremely rich families. However, those extremely rich families were so few and so far away
from others that one may take it as outlier.
       I thank Casey Mulligan for bringing this to my attention.
17
       Strictly speaking, the studies by these authors are not the same as traditional mobility studies.
18
In the study by Cooper, Durlauf, and Johnson (1993), for example, the focus was not on how an
individual’s status is determined, but on how measured mobility is sensitive to different
neighborhoods. Non-linearities of intergenerational relationship were found in the study, as families
residing in relatively affluent or poor communities exhibit more persistence in economic status than
families residing in communities near the middle of the income distribution.
30
elasticities to be very close to zero for those families.  The conclusion: my model about the mechanism
16
of lifetime earnings transmission is empirically supported.
The inverted U shape of elasticity curves suggests that, in terms of lifetime economic status and
one the average, sons from poor (rich) families have better chance to move up (down) than maintain
their original statuses. This finding cannot be compared directly with other mobility studies, because
those studies have never used a status measure covering individual lifetime earnings experience.
Ignoring the differences  in the method of status measurement, however, the finding is consistent with
evidence reported by Brittan (1977), who found that for families whose relative status ranking at the
top 10 percentile of the sample, the sons’ expected income ranking was about 21, whereas for families
whose percentile ranking was at 90, the sons’ ranking was about 79 (p.58).  On the other hand, the
17
elasticity curves reported here are  in sharp contrast with some recent studies on non-linearities of
intergenerational earnings mobility. For example, also using the PSID, Mulligan (1993) found no
evidence on non-linearities. In their attempts to incorporate the family’s neighborhood selection into
the determination process of an individual’s economic status, several other authors--including Cooper,
Durlauf and Johnson (1994) and Durlauf (1996)--suggested that the intergenerational persistence of
earnings was greatest at the extremes of the income distribution. In other words, they found elasticity
curves to be of U-shape.
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One lesson from these conflicting results about intergenerational economic mobility is clear: the31
judgment about the extent to which socioeconomic status is transmitted from one generation to the next
is greatly sensitive to the way individual status is measured. Except for the present study, most of the
aforementioned studies approximated an individual’s economic status by averaging a single-year variable
such as earnings over a span of several years. But how long a time span should be and in what periods
an individual’s earnings should be used are often a question of data availability. Consequently, to have
a better understanding of the intergenerational relationship, one first has to answer a more fundamental
question: how should we measure an individual’s status? Since lifetime earnings are a better measure
of individual status than most of previously used short-run variables, the findings from this study may
be of more significance.
c. Comparisons with the linear transmission equation
Attention to non-linearities of the intergenerational relationship is only a recent phenomenon.
The dominant practice in the studies of intergenerational mobility has been confined to a linear
transmission process. Although our specification tests have revealed that the linear transmission process
is inferior to the cubic, it is worthwhile examining how mobility results based on a linear equation
would change as one changes individual status measure from short-run variables to lifetime earnings.
Based on the linear equation (4.3a), the elasticity of the son’s lifetime earnings with respect to
the father’s, listed in the last column of Table 4, would be around .27. This number is slightly higher
than suggested in most studies surveyed in Becker and Tomes (1986), which used short-run variables
as proxies for individual permanent status and did not correct the Errors-in-Variables (EIV) problem.
It is not, nevertheless, as high as claimed by Solon (1992) or Zimmerman (1992b), who believed that,
if an individual's permanent status itself, not any of its proxies, were used, the number might be above
.4. 
It is not surprising that the elasticities reported in the last column of Table 4 were higher than
those collected in Becker and Tomes (1986). For, relative to short-run proxies, lifetime earnings clear
out some transitory noises that might reduce elasticities. But why were those elasticities lower than
claimed by Solon (1992) and Zimmerman (1992b)? One hypothesis is that, while clearing out some       This is the working span that an individual with 8 years of schooling retires at age 65.
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transitory noises essentially included in a short-run proxy, lifetime earnings as permanent status may
bring in new sources of variation that were originally not in the proxy. In both Solon (1992) and
Zimmerman (1992b), an individual's permanent status was defined as a constant stream of earnings over
his working span. But the working span is not identical across individuals. Differential working spans
may be a source contributing to lower elasticities.
A simple test with an assumption that all individuals have worked or will work for 51 years
19
is in favor of the hypothesis. As shown in Table 5, where I duplicated the calculations in Table 4 under
the fixed working span assumption, all elasticities -- in absolute values -- were larger when the working
Table 5. The Elasticity of the Son's adjusted Lifetime Earnings
with respect to the Father's: Cubic and Linear Status Transmission 
Equation, and Fixed Working Spans
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                     Cubic Equation                        
-------------------------------------------------
                                                    Father's log earnings: Percentile                 Linear    
               -------------------------------------------------            Equation
5th 25th Mean 50th 75th 95th             
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
1 B -.078 .337 .434 .447 .485 .441    .303
2 B -.022 .331 .408 .412 .428 .347    .299
3 B -.088 .335 .439 .448 .490 .452    .303
4 B -.037 .340 .421 .426 .442 .353    .300
5 B -.089 .335 .440 .446 .493 .455    .303
6 B -.053 .347 .433 .437 .453 .359    .305
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Note: All elasticities in this table were calculated with the assumption that individuals 
have worked or will work for 51 years.
spans were fixed than when they were not. However, the elasticities based on the linear equation were
still far from .4 claimed by Solon and Zimmerman. Further, the inverted U-shape of the elasticity curves33
remained intact with the alternative assumption, suggesting that the non-linear relationship between
generations in lifetime earnings was not due to differential working spans. 
The linear transmission equation predicts the "average" degree to which socioeconomic status
is transmitted from one generation to the next. For the cubic equation, the "average" degree of
transmission may be calculated at the mean (or median) value of the father's log lifetime earnings; and
it was in neighborhood of .38 (Table 4), greater than both the elasticities in the Becker-Tomes survey
(.2), and those following the linear transmission equation and at the same time using lifetime earnings
as a proxy of individual status (.27).  This suggests that both the EIV problem and the linear
specification contribute to the underestimation of the "average" degree of earnings transmission.
 
  C. The Effects of the Non-Family Factors on Mobility: Preliminary Results
It is known to us that intergenerational mobility is determined by both the family and the
society. However, the relative effect of one factor to another has seldom been seriously discussed. One
reason is that the conventional specification of the intergenerational transmission process has almost
always been linear, which hinders attempts to separate the effect of one factor from another. The
inverted U-shape of elasticity curves, along with hypotheses about the society, may help in this regard.
If the society is a continuum, and, as espoused in the “American Dream”, provides people with
equal opportunities, different elasticities across families would be accounted for only by family- related
variables. That is, it would be the family-related forces that make both poor and rich families experience
higher mobility than those in the middle. Presumably, the most important force may be fathers’
investments in their sons, constrained by diminishing returns to the investments. Relative to “middle”
families, poor families invest less in their sons, but their investments are more productive. The sons’
dependency on their fathers’ is alleviated by higher returns to the investments. By contrast, rich families
invest more in their sons, but their investments are less productive. The sons’ dependency on their
fathers is also alleviated, but by lower returns to the investments.
Of course, the society envisioned in the model presented in this paper does provide the same       To calculate these elasticities, I first imputed the human capital price facing each cohort, based
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on the strategy illustrated in Appendix B. Using this price, I then imputed all other variables necessary
for imputing lifetime earnings. Holding the imputations for other variables intact, and setting the
human capital price equal to unity for all cohorts, I got lifetime earnings and earnings elasticities
under the alternative assumption. Throughout the rest of the paper, I will not report results for the
12 population parameters B  and B . The schooling regression (b.3) did not work well when " = ½.
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opportunities for poor families as for rich families. For example, while it has little adverse effect on rich
fathers’ investments in sons, the quasi-perfect physical capital market makes poor fathers invest less in
their sons than they would if they could borrow to finance investments. In the latter scenario, poor
fathers would–through “education loan”–make investment decisions in such a way as to equate the
marginal rate of return to the investments with the interest rate in the market. Total returns captured by
their sons would be larger; their sons’ relative status would improve; and the earnings mobility for those
families might be even higher. High mobility experienced by poor families is therefor a net result
balancing a higher mobility potential due to the family forces, and the disadvantages that the quasi-
perfect capital market imposes on those families.
The effects of the family and the society on earnings mobility may also be examined by
comparing the real world with a hypothesized society where the effects of certain variables are
neutralized. The difference in mobility patterns between the two worlds would then inform us of how
the real society has affected mobility.
a. Human capital price
Human capital price is a variable determined by the demand for and supply of human capital
in the labor market. A constant for an individual over his life cycle, the price may be regarded as an
indicator of average social opportunities provided to the individual as well as his fellows in the same
cohort. In response to macro changes in the society, the price varies across cohorts, and, supposedly,
has affected the measured earnings mobility.
What would happen with mobility should the price not change over time? Table 6, Panel A
answers the question. The elasticities in the panel were calculated for four representative families, and
under the assumption that human capital price were equal to unity for all cohorts.  As in Tables 4 and
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5, "25th" stands for the family in which the father's log lifetime earnings is at the 25th percentile, "50th"
for the family at the 50th percentile, etc. The elasticity curves maintained an inverted U shape under
the new assumption. Except for rich families (above the 85th percentile), the elasticities were greater --
but not very much -- than those in the real world, which are listed in panel D. Overall, the variation
in human capital price has contributed to increasing earnings mobility, as expected.
Table 6. The Effects of Human Capital Price and Age Structure on Mobility
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                              "=2/3     "=2/3     "=3/4     "=3/4     
     Control                               r=.02      r=.05      r=.02      r=.05
     Variable(s)                            *=.05     *=.05      *=.05     *=.05
     ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
     (A)               25th     .314        .376        .305        .357
     Human Capital 50th     .398        .473        .386        .439
     Price 
                   75th     .423        .480        .408        .438
                   95th     .361        .329        .343        .282
     ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
        (B)         25th     .278        .263        .280        .260
         Age        50th     .385        .356        .381        .354
     Structure
                    75th     .434        .402        .429        .401
                    95th     .446        .414        .442        .415
     ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
        (C )         25th     .278        .256        .274        .254
     Human Capital   50th     .368        .348        .356        .343
     Price and Age
     Structure          75th     .408        .394        .397        .384
                    95th     .395        .393        .384        .380
     ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
        (D)         25th     .281        .333        .279        .331
     No Control     50th     .375        .404        .366        .400
     (Selected from 
      Table 4)        75th     .411        .409        .401        .405
                    95th     .392        .304        .381        .299
     ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
     Note: In panel (A), I assumed that human capital price did not change across 
     cohorts. In panel (B), I eliminated age differences within generations, and
     assumed that the differences between generations were uniformly equal to 28,
     the average age difference between fathers and sons in the sample. In panel
     (C ), I controlled both human capital price and age structure. In panel (D),
     neither human capital price nor age structure was controlled.        Apparently, in this hypothesized world, no age differences exist within generations, and the age
21
differences between generations are identical for all families. 
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Poor and rich families respond to the variation in human capital price in different ways. While
poor families have higher mobility in the real society than in the hypothesized world, rich families tend
to have lower mobility. Since higher mobility is good for poor families, but not for rich families, the
exercise shows that both poor and rich families have taken advantage of the variation in human capital
price.
b. Age structure
Age structure in this work is referred to as (i) age distributions within generations; and (ii) age
differences between generations. Although it results from individual families' fertility decisions, age
structure is a social variable over which any single individual or family has no direct control.
To see how age structure affects earnings mobility, imagine a population in which all fathers'
ages were the same, and became fathers at some age simultaneously.  The earnings elasticities for this
21
imagined population were reported in Table 6, panel B. The differences between the real society and
the hypothesized population in elasticity showed no uniform pattern. For example, for the population
3 parameter set B , the elasticities were universally larger in the hypothesized world than in the real
world; but for other population parameter sets, the elasticities were larger only for some families.
Unlike in panel A or D, the elasticity curves in the hypothesized world no longer maintained
an inverted U shape. Instead, they were uniformly monotonically increasing with the family status: The
richer a family, the larger elasticity, and the lower mobility. 
The distinct mobility patterns in the real society and in the imagined world inform us of
significant effects of age structure. This is surprising, for the age structure has been neglected in almost
all empirical efforts to measure mobility. Usually, researchers take for granted whatever intergenerational
samples available to them, without investigating how sensitive their findings on mobility are to the ways
of sample construction. On the other hand, since age structure is related to families' fertility decisions,
which may be an important argument in individual lifetime utility function, the significant effects of37
age structure should not be beyond expectation.
c. Human capital price and age structure
The effect of age structure on mobility seemed to be more significant than the effect of human
capital price. But the two effects were in opposite directions. This result may be found in Table 6, panel
C, where both human capital price and age structure were controlled. Except for some very rich
families, the elasticities in panel C were lower than those not only in panel A, but also in panel B.
Should human capital price and the age structure affect mobility in the same direction, the elasticities
in panel C would be the largest among the three panels.
Except for rich families, the elasticities in panel C were even lower than those in panel D or
in the real society. Since low elasticities are good for poor families but bad for rich families, the
evidence  implies that, in terms on earnings mobility, the real society is worse for all families than the
world characterized in panel C. One possible explanation for this is the following: Human capital price
and the age structure are correlated with each other; one cannot expect a world where both variables
are controlled independently.
VI. Concluding Remarks
This paper supports a very general result: When an individual's status is measured by his
lifetime earnings, intergenerational relationship in status is generally non-linear. The result is consistent
with a  two-stage life cycle model in which individuals maximize their lifetime earnings at the early
stage, and maximize their lifetime utilities at the other. Intergenerational relationship in lifetime earnings
is built on genetic connections between generations as well as parental altruism toward children. It is
also qualified by social factors that are beyond the family's control.
Using data from the PSID, I have found that the elasticity of the son's lifetime earnings with
respect to the father's is not constant across families. Earnings mobility is higher for both poor and rich
families than for the families in the middle. In sharp contrast with some recent studies on non-linearities
of intergenerational earnings mobility, this result suggests that mobility studies are very sensitive to the38
way in which an individual's status is measured.
One important feature of the work is that it essentially allows for examining the relative effect
on mobility of non-family factors to family factors. While not conclusive, the attempts comparing
mobility patterns in the real society with those in some hypothesized worlds do show potentials for
further research on the relative effect.
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Appendix A. The Intertemporal and Lifetime Earnings
This appendix is to derive the intertemporal and lifetime earnings for the representative
individual based on the model in Section III. The Hamiltonian associated with the problem is
 (a-1)
where  q(t) is a non-negative costate variable indicating the shadow demand price of the human capital






where  C is a constant of integration. Assuming q(T) = 0, that is, human capital is useless at the end of
the planning horizon, equation (a-4) is reduced to 
 (a-5)
Substituting (a-5) into (a-2), we get the dynamics of the human capital stock devoted to the 
human capital production,
 (a-6)
This dynamics implicitly determines the individual's profile of human capital stock.
Substituting the dynamics into the human capital production function (3.2) in the text, we know
t that a closed form expression for the intertemporal human capital stock K is available only when "
takes on value n/(n+1), with n a positive integer. We call the "'s satisfying the restriction as  admissible.
t The above results are generally not valid for corner solutions. In the first phase, when s = 1,
we have the following differential equation,41
 (a-7)
It has a solution
 (a-8)
The transition period from the first phase to the second, t , is determined by equalizing (a-8) with (a-6),
*
which gives rise to the "schooling equation" (3.4) in the text.
The third phase has no real implication for our purpose, as it occurs when and only when the
individual reaches the end of the planning horizon: Check equation (a-5), q(t) = 0 if and only if t = T.
The representative has positive earnings only in the second phase. For any admissible ", and
t with the corresponding closed form expression for K, (a-6) directly leads to an intertemporal earnings
profile as defined in equation (3.5). In turn, the intertemporal earnings yields an index for the
unadjusted lifetime earnings, defined in equation (3.6). 




0ij ij Here,  K  is the initial human capital stock of individual j of cohort i; X  is his early family background
ii 1 2 variables;  a is the human capital price shared by cohort i; d is the cohort dummy vector; b , b , (, and
ij i 8 are scaler or vector coefficients; and ,  and : are zero mean disturbances independent of each other,
ii j and uncorrelated with (d, X ).
Substitute equations (b.1) and (b.2) into the schooling equation (4.3). After some manipulations,
one should be able to get the following "schooling" regression,
 (b.3)42
i where :, and z(t ) is defined in
*
1 equation (3.14). Substituting imputed in equation (4.2a) into the regression, and normalizing b  to
be unity, one should get 
(b.4)
where (b.5)
Appendix C. Intergenerational Earnings Transmission: Specification Tests
Consider the following pair of linear regressions
©.1)
(C.2)
where and are the logarithms of the son's and the father's adjusted lifetime
earnings; is zero mean normal disturbance uncorrelated with the independent variables in each
regression; l and k are integers indicating, in addition to constant terms, the numbers of independent
variables in two regressions; and, of course, l > k. A test of the hypothesis that regression (C.2) is not
worse than (C.1) may be conducted by testing the null hypothesis that
(C.3)
LS Denote the sums of residual squares in two regressions as SSR  and SSR , and the sample size
as N. It can be shown that the following statistic
(C.4)
follows a F distribution with degrees of freedom (l-k) and (N-l-1). 
If the linear specification is tested against the cubic, l = 3 and k = 1, as the null hypothesis
becomes If the quadratic specification is tested against the cubic, however, l = 3 but43
k = 2, and the null hypothesis is
A comparison between the cubic and the quadrinomial specifications requires the quadrinomial
being the baseline, when l = 4, k = 3, and the null hypothesis is